What makes acts right ross summary

Perhaps the more appropriate route for her is not to opt for revision to common-sense morality. Instead, perhaps the better strategy is to suggest that they can capture the importance of promise keeping to common-sense morality by holding that promise keeping is intrinsically valuable or at least that promise breaking is intrinsically evil Johnson , ; Ewing , ; Brennan ; Shaver The general strategy is to subsume all of Ross's non-utilitarian duties in this way.

This is a compelling response. To assess it, it is important to examine his theory of value. Virtue, knowledge and pleasure are states of mind, while justice is a relation between states of mind RG Ross holds that virtue is the most important and that some virtuous motives are more important than others e.

Knowledge is the next most important of the values. The least most valuable is pleasure RG It is not clear where to place justice in this hierarchy, since Ross says only that it is less valuable than virtue RG — It is not implausible to think that it should be placed between virtuous knowledge and pleasure, and therefore that the values are ranked as follows: virtue, virtuous knowledge, justice and pleasure.

In FE, Ross defends a slightly different view. But in FE he revises this view. The goodness of these things is not intrinsic to them; rather, it is a relational property, which depends on our rightly taking an interest or rightly finding some kind of satisfaction in them FE One's own pleasure is not an object of sympathetic satisfaction, since one cannot feel sympathy for oneself; instead, one's own pleasure is merely an inevitable object of satisfaction FE That in FE Ross holds that there are four goods is controversial.

It has been suggested that in FE Ross rejects the view that pleasure is intrinsically good Stratton-Lake a xli—xlii, b This is hard to accept. Finally, it really would be contrary to the plain man's view and to reflective thinking to deny that pleasure is a good and that pain is an evil. In early writings, he claims that justice is a requirement of duty not a value OJ However, since he suggests quite clearly at one point that he thinks that justice is good in the same sense that the pleasure of others is good it is not unreasonable to think that he holds that justice is a good FE — He also suggests at one point that promise keeping is good in the same way that justice and pleasure are good FE But he more often rejects the claim that promise keeping is good FE , , suggesting that not all things that are objects worthy of satisfaction are valuable.

It is now possible to assess the second ideal utilitarian reply to Ross mentioned above. Some ideal utilitarians contend that his objections to the view may be overcome by arguing that promise keeping, reparation, and gratitude are non-instrumentally valuable.

The most plausible argument of this variety states that Ross must accept that promise keeping is valuable or at least that promise breaking is evil because he accepts that knowledge and justice are valuable and there is no real distinction between these values and the value of keeping promises or the disvalue of breaking promises Shaver The characterisation provided above of Ross's theory of value provides him with a defence.

He seems to insist on any occasions that only states of mind or relations between states of mind have value. Promise keeping, reparation, and gratitude are not merely states of mind or relations between states of mind.

Therefore, they cannot be good. One worry is that knowledge is not merely a state of consciousness. In RG, Ross insists that knowledge has intrinsic value. He sometimes suggests this in FE. However, his considered view is that it is not knowledge but intellectual and aesthetic activities that have value FE 19, 27, 73, , , , , , —, , , ; also OJ , , ; KT It is not unreasonable to think that Ross moved away from thinking that it is knowledge that has value and to thinking that it is intellectual and aesthetic activity that has value because only the latter is properly called a state of consciousness.

This might be problematic for Ross. If he rejects the idea that knowledge is intrinsically valuable while accepting that intellectual activities are intrinsically valuable, he cannot account for the fact that knowledge appears to be more important than justified opinion Shaver But Ross can argue that knowledge is more important because of its instrumental properties, e.

A fortiori the claim that it is intellectual activities that are intrinsically good explains why some instances of knowledge are more important than others.

The value of the intellectual activities explains the value of the knowledge. But what about the fact that justice is an intrinsic value? It is not a state of consciousness; it is a relation between states of mind RG If Ross is willing to accept this as a good, why not accept that promise keeping, and so on, are good?

It might be that he can still insist that justice is different from promise keeping, reparation, and gratitude because it is compounded from states of consciousness and that is why it and not these other things are good. However, perhaps the better reply is simply to drop justice from his list of values. He repeatedly contends that it is only states of mind that have value OJ ; RG , —, ; FE , ; KT 21 , and justice is not a state of mind.

He can insist on this view and block the ideal utilitarian response. He is open to characterising justice as a requirement of duty rather than a value FE , and he loses little by dropping it as a value. Further, he might argue that understanding justice as a moral requirement is the best way to think of it if one wants to capture what we think.

Ross relies quite heavily on the Moorean isolation method to defend his value theory Moore His value theory came under much less scrutiny than did his deontic theory, and therefore he did not see fit to consider monistic responses to it.

This may in part be due to the fact that there is agreement amongst his main rivals—Moore, Rashdall, Pickard-Cambridge, Ewing, and Johnson—that value pluralism is true.

This may also be due in part to the fact that he considered the main monistic rival—that is, hedonism—a dead end RG 98; FE But hedonism lives on Feldman ; Mendola ; Crisp ; Bradley Therefore, it may be that Ross's value theory is in for a challenge that neither he nor his ideal utilitarian critics anticipated.

To get a taste of what this challenge may look like consider the following hedonistic reply to Ross's argument for the idea that virtue is intrinsically valuable. Hedonists hold pace Ross that while it is obvious that virtue is instrumentally good and vice is instrumentally bad, it is far from clear that the former is intrinsically good and the latter is intrinsically bad. In response, Ross asks us to imagine two worlds, W 1 and W 2. W 1 and W 2 include the same quantity of pleasure. However, W 1 contains agents that are virtuous, who act from or who are disposed to act from the right motives, while W 2 contains agents who are vicious, who act from or who are disposed to act from the wrong motives.

Is not W 1 preferable to W 2? Ross thinks it is, and he says that what explains this is that virtue is intrinsically good RG But the hedonist has a reply. The situation envisaged is impossible, for surely W 1 would have more pleasure than W 2 because typically virtuous people produce more pleasure than vicious people.

Indeed, would not a world with virtuous people be more likely to continue to be filled with pleasure and lack the possibility of descending into chaos than a world with vicious people? Is not this ultimately the reason why we desire or prefer it? In response, Ross reminds us that not all pleasure springs from the actions of virtuous people and not all pain springs from actions of vicious RG Suppose, then, that there are two worlds, W 1 and W 2.

Ross contends that it is still the case that the virtuous world, W 1 , is better than W 2. This is a good response, but the hedonist has a rejoinder. Would not W 1 be on the whole better hedonistically speaking in the long run because of the virtuous people?

Would not W 1 be a place where it is more likely to be the case that a cure is found or where it is more likely that pain is treated effectively and sympathetically or where it is more likely to remain stable enough to handle the disease and illness? Ross may rely on strategies that are similar to the ones he adopts against the ideal utilitarian's attempt to show that she can explain the importance of promise keeping RG But it is clear that proponents of Ross's view of value may well have to contend with arguments of this variety given the recent resurgence of hedonism.

How do we acquire moral and axiological knowledge? Our knowledge of the basic moral and axiological propositions which are the object of our moral intuitions is non-inferential OJ , ; RG 29, ; FE , , , They are non-inferentially knowable because they are self-evident or knowable on the basis of an understanding alone RG 20n1, 29; FE For example, that we have a responsibility to keep our promises is self-evident.

It is by a process of reflection on this proposition that we come to apprehend that we have this responsibility. Ross thinks we can trust our moral apprehensions, and since apprehension is a matter of knowledge, and knowledge implies certainty, he is certain that we have the above responsibilities and that certain things are intrinsically valuable RG , 29, 30; KT 42; cf.

Audi That our responsibilities are self-evident does not entail that they are obvious to everyone who reflects on them. The analogy with mathematics is instructive, for we acquire our moral knowledge in the same way we acquire knowledge of mathematical axioms. We apprehend the algorithm in the particular cases after repeated exposure to particular instances of its application, by a process of intuitive induction FE We apprehend that it is prima facie right to keep promises by apprehending that it is prima facie right to fulfill this or that particular promise.

How do we decide what we ought to do, all things considered, in some particular circumstance? We never know what we ought to do all things considered. An example will help us here. Imagine that I can help my neighbour with his gardening project and this will produce a lot of good for both of us. I have also promised you that I will meet you to discuss an assignment, but this produces less good than helping my neighbour.

Ross says that in this case we have to balance the two responsibilities. He thinks that typically the requirement to keep one's promises is more stringent than the requirement to benefit other people RG The act which is one's actual duty or duty proper is the one for which one is most responsible or to which the weightier of one's responsibilities attach FE 85; RG 41— It is important to note that all of the responsibilities have a valence, positive or negative, and this valence persists even when a responsibility is outweighed by weightier responsibilities.

This epistemology has been attacked from a variety of different angles. One main worry is that there is very little agreement in intuitions, and this suggests that there is no fact of the matter as to what has value or what one is responsible for.

Ross concedes that there is a lot of disagreement. He thinks that most of the differences concern media axiomata , i. About these, he says that intuitionists must have an open mind FE There are many differences that cannot be explained away in this fashion, however FE These disagreements should not, he thinks, undermine our confidence that there is objective moral truth.

It is very hard to see a resolution to these problems. He says that despite changes in scientific theories there is a sense that science progresses toward the truth.

The same is true in ethics. The difficulty with this response is that whereas in scientific matters there is an independent way of establishing progress, there is no such independent or seemingly independent way of establishing this in ethics.

Recent research in the social sciences on moral judgement should not leave us confident Greene ; Singer The problems with Ross's moral epistemology are compounded by the fact that he thinks that the principles of his framework best reflect the main elements of common-sense moral thinking, and that this is necessary to an acceptable moral theory.

This threatens to make his position appear parochial Hare He is aware of this worry. He replies by noting that the number of principles that intuitionism endorses is small in number and general in content and that this leaves room to reject much of what is commonly taken to be right FE This seems like the right kind of move to make.

However, it puts him in a rather awkward position. If it really is true that the number is small and that it is possible therefore to reject much of what is commonly recognized to be morally required, then the position has a more reformist edge, and to the extent that it is reformist it is more rather than less like the other views that Ross rejects.

In this case, it makes it much more difficult for him to fault his rivals for not capturing common-sense morality. If he attempts to move more toward the plain man's view, then although he can more easily raise objections to ideal utilitarianism and other views, he is much more likely to lose his critical element and therefore fend off the charge of parochialism. The point may be made another way.

The more general and less robust his list of responsibilities and goods the less likely the charge of parochialism may stick, but it is also less likely that the view is as close to common sense as he suggests, in which case that his opponents deviate from it to some extent is not a mark against them or at least cannot be used by Ross as a mark against them.

Like many in his time, Ross took pains to undermine various definitions of moral terms. He draws a distinction between naturalistic and non-naturalistic definitions.

These goods are not objects worthy of admiration but rather fit objects of satisfaction. Ross suggests a number of arguments against various naturalistic and non-naturalistic definitions of moral terms. He relies in part on the following kind of argument, which is directed at Moore RG 8. It is intelligible that these propositions should have been denied and maintained with so much fervour.

This argument can be generalised to reject the usual suspects, e. But it is not the best argument, since we may well fight over analytic propositions, especially when they are opaque or unobvious. Historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all right actions that is the foundation of their rightness have been based on egoism and hedonistic utilitarianism; these are not discussed except in so far as they are contrasted with the other theory put forward, which is G.

Moore's theory suggesting that what makes actions right is that they are productive of good. The main aspect of this addressed is that of duty prima facie duty , and the consideration leads to a rejection of the definition of right as just productive of the best possible consequences or optimific. The connection between the attributes of right and optimific is discussed, and the nature of acts that are right including individual right acts is explored in more detail.

Two appendices follow Chapter II: the first discusses rights as opposed to right ; the second discusses punishment in connection with the preceding discussion on rights.

Keywords: duty , egoism , hedonistic utilitarianism , optimific , prima facie duty , productive of good , punishment , right , right acts , rightness , rights , utilitarianism. Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service.

Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter. Please, subscribe or login to access full text content. To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us. All Rights Reserved. OSO version 0. I believe that people should not be virtuous or doing the right thing if it will make their image or who they are look better.

I believe that if one honestly thinks that an action is the right thing to do, then they should carry out that action. For example, if I were in a situation in which I know a friend of mine witnessed a crime happen, I would tell her to do what she thinks is morally right, whether it was to ignore the situation. Singer is a utilitarian philosopher, along with the likes of other famous philosophers such as David Hume and Henry Sidgwick.

Utilitarianism is a type of consequentialism in which it is believed that the right act to perform is the one that produces the most utility, or good. In society, people should be ethically responsible with helping people. People act ethically responsible when one is in need of assistance because they let their sympathetic feelings of compassion take over their intentions.

Studies Really Show. It looks at justice in respect to human life as a whole, religion and culture not taken into consideration. This is the concern of goodness and goodwill for your companions and leading because it is a beautiful, chosen virtue Ethics, III, a, Another ethical principle that can be applied to the case is the deontological theory of categorical imperative.

Also under this principle it is the responsibility of the business to do the greatest good for its stakeholders in general. When Cathy stated his stance against same-sex marriage he was not thinking of his customers or the employees of the organization.

As the owner of Chick-fil-A he did not respect people and. D Ross, he debates the about idea of duties and how humans in general understand if their actions are correct.

Ross mentions that humans do not deliberately execute their duties because of the consequences resulting from those duties. Rather, they perform those duties because of an innate form of common sense that humans possess inside of themselves. Even though Ross applauds the idea of benevolence in utilitarianism and the importance of justice, he disapproved of maximizing happiness as the main duty and stating that the moral rules were absolute.